In January 2002, Bush and Dick Cheney ask Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle not to conduct any inquiry into 9/11 intelligence failures. The Senate launches one anyway.

"To get to the point, I have deep concerns that a delicate and subtle shading/skewing of facts by you and others at the highest levels of FBI management has occurred and is occurring...

"I feel that certain facts...have, up to now, been omitted, downplayed, glossed over and/or mis-characterized in an effort to avoid or minimize personal and/or institutional embarrassment on the part of the FBI and/or perhaps even for improper political reasons..."

In September of that year, Senator Richard Shelby, ranking Republican on the Senate Armed Services Committee, complains that the Bush Administration is dragging its feet with the Congressional inquiry, telling the New York Times: "…we were told that there would be cooperation in this investigation, and I question that." He further complains that the key info has had to be extracted "piece-by-piece."

An interim report on the Congressional investigation notes that the CIA director refuses to declassify for access by the investigators any records regarding what information was given by intelligence agencies to the president.

In November of that year, after months of pressure by families of the 9/11 victims, the Bush Administration agrees to an independent, blue-ribbon investigation into the attacks, but does not want the investigation to focus on what intelligence information was given to the president.

George W. Bush names former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to head the blue-ribbon investigation. Kissinger has a history of being involved in cover-ups that includes lying to Congress about having organized the secret bombing of Cambodia in 1969.

A month later, rather than address an apparent conflict of interest by revealing the identities of his consulting company’s clients -- some of whom are believed to be Saudi businessmen -- Kissinger resigns his post as head of the 9/11 panel.

Then Bush appoints former N.J. Governor Tom Kean -- a man with no major investigative, intelligence, or foreign policy experience -- to replace Kissinger as head of the 9/11 panel. Kean is on the board of directors of the Amerada Hess petroleum corporation, which does business in Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, and Malaysia -- three major stops on the al Qaeda world tour.

Then Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott rejects the preferred choice of the families of 9/11 victims for a seat on the blue-ribbon panel, former Republican Senator Warren Rudman. Rudman had previously spent two years investigating America’s national security vulnerabilities, co-authoring a report on the topic in January 2001. The families had considered him the only prominent Republican who could be trusted on the 5-Democrat/5-Republican panel to follow the trail of information even if it were to lead to the Bush White House. Instead, John Lehman, former Navy Secretary under Ronald Reagan is appointed to the final spot on the panel.

July, 2003: After being screened by the White House, the final report from the previous year’s congressional inquiry is released. An entire 28-page section on the involvement of Saudi Arabia has been blacked-out in the report.

A few months into its work, the independent 9/11 commission issues a progress report which complains that the Justice Department and the Defense Department are moving way too slowly in giving the commission the documents it has requested.

October, 2003: Citing unreleased documents, the commission subpoenas records from the Federal Aviation Administration.

November, 2003: Citing unreleased documents, the commission subpoenas records from the North American Aerospace Defense Command.

The Administration places limits on the commission’s access to the text of Presidential Daily Briefings, which would let it know what information had been given to the president before the attacks. Only 4 of the 10 commission members are allowed to see the briefings: co-Chairs Kean and Lee Hamilton, Zelikow and Democrat Jamie Gorelick. They are not permitted to make copies of the briefings; they may only take notes, which must be cleared by the White House before anyone else on the commission may see them. The White House takes three months to clear a 17-page summary of the notes.

January, 2004: The commission complains that administration foot-dragging is making it unlikely the commission will meet the May 27^th deadline set for the completion of their work. The White House refuses the commission’s request for a two-month extension.

February, 2004: Under pressure from the 9/11 families, the White House claims it does support an extension of the deadline, but that it is Republican Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert that is refusing the request.

Bush refuses to let National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice testify in public and under oath before the commission, citing the principles of "executive privilege" and "separation of powers."

Bush agrees to meet with the commission in private and not under oath, but places a one-hour limit on the meeting, and allows only the two co-Chairs to participate.

March, 2004: Under pressure from the 9/11 families, Speaker Hastert drops his opposition to the two-month extension for the commission.

Under pressure from the 9/11 families, Bush gives up the one-hour limit on his meeting, allows all ten members to participate. But only one member will be allowed to take notes, and Bush will not testify without Dick Cheney at his side. Former President Clinton and Vice President Gore agree to meet individually with the commission.

Under pressure from everybody, including the 9/11 families, Bush decides to allow Condi Rice to testify in public and under oath before the commission.

April, 2004: White House blocks commission access to 9,000 pages Clinton papers on security and terrorism issues, claiming they are either "duplicative" of other information the commission already has or "non-responsive" to information the commission is requesting. Almost immediately after this is revealed in the media, Bush relents and allows access to the papers. Among them is the 1998 memo signed by Clinton authorizing the CIA to assassinate Osama bin Laden upon locating him.

The White House refuses to release the text of a Condi Rice speech that she had been prepared to deliver on 9/11/01 discussing her national security plan. The speech, pre-empted by the attacks, called defense against intercontinental ballistic missiles the top security priority, while making no mention of Al Qaeda or fanatical Islamist terrorism. The White House claims the draft of the speech, which was to have been given in public, is "confidential."

Testifying before the commission, Condi Rice frequently dismisses a famous August 6^th, 2001 presidential briefing as containing "historical" information and being warning-free. Several commissioners, having a different sense of the briefing’s contents, make repeated requests to Dr. Rice to de-classify it so the public may view it.

Anonymous sources familiar with the Aug. 6 memo leak to the news media that it was more than just a historical review; it also suggested Al Qaeda personnel were already in the United States, and it further contained information suggesting a hijacking, an attack with explosives, or both were in the works. Following the leak, the White House declassifies and releases the Aug. 6 memo.

The Justice Department goes to court to prevent former FBI translator Sibel Edmonds from testifying on behalf of some 9/11 families who have filed civil lawsuits in connection with the attacks. Edmonds has suggested in media interviews that she knows for a fact that the FBI did have evidence that Al Qaeda was planning an attack against the U.S. using airplanes. The Bush administration is claiming that her testimony would reveal "state secrets," jeopardizing national security.